“Slow to Learn: Bargaining, Uncertainty, and the Calculus of Conquest,” with William Spaniel. Journal of Conflict Resolution (2018) 62(4): 774-796. Here is the latest version prior to publication.
“Bureaucrats, Judges, and Policy Quality,” with Lawrence S. Rothenberg. Revise & Resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
“Lobbying and Policy Extremism in Repeated Elections,” with John Duggan and Gleason Judd.
“Rubberstamping,” with Robert J. Carroll and Lawrence S. Rothenberg.
Works in Progress
“Policy Preferences, Crisis Initiation, and Conflict Duration,” with Bradley C. Smith and William Spaniel.
How do policy preferences affect the initiation and duration of militarized disputes? We analyze a simple war of attrition model in which countries compete over policy. The model produces two testable predictions. First, increasing the ideological distance
between countries increases the probability of crisis onset. Second, an increase in the ideological distance between two countries increases the duration of a conflict. Using ideal point estimates from United Nations General Assembly voting data we test our hypotheses against the empirical record. The results of the empirical models provide evidence favoring both hypotheses: we estimate that moving across the interquartile range of ideological differences almost doubles the probability of dispute onset and reduces the likelihood of settlement in the first month by 15%.
“The Amicus Game,” with Lawrence S. Rothenberg and Bradley C. Smith.